Information flow analysis checks whether certain pieces of (confidential) data may affect the results of computations in unwanted ways and thus leak information. Dynamic information flow analysis adds instrumentation code to the target software to track flows at run time and raise alarms if a flow policy is violated; hybrid analyses combine this with preliminary static analysis.
Motivation
Information flow analysis is the study of how pieces of confidential data propagate through programs and affect computations. Typically one wishes to enforce a security policy stating that confidential data is forbidden from influencing 'public' outputs [5] . This concept was generalized as the non-interference property which states that certain classes of computations must not affect others [7] .
A wide range of non-interference analyses exist, both static and dynamic ones as well as hybrid combinations. Dynamic analyses are popular because they are more permissive in general, i. e., they reject fewer programs that are in fact safe, and they allow unsafe programs as long as only safe program paths are executed. Further, they can be applied to programming languages such as JavaScript which are not amenable to static analysis and commonly used in settings where code is loaded dynamically.
For example, web pages can include JavaScript code from several different servers. Each of these pieces of code can both read and write the entire document that includes it; this means that confidential personal information known to one server might be exfiltrated to others. Web browsers can use dynamic information flow analysis to track the origins of each piece of data and forbid unwanted flows of possibly sensitive data from one Internet domain to another [11, 9] .
Not all applications of information flow analysis are directly related to security or privacy, however; the analysis can also have more general software engineering uses to enforce application-specific properties. For example, an industry partner would like us to verify that their code handling the routing of network packets only depends on packet headers but not the payload. In terms of information flow analysis, the packet payload is treated as 'confidential' data that is not allowed to affect the handling of the packet in any way.
In order to be able to enforce such properties, we are developing a hybrid information flow analysis, trying to unify the best features of static and dynamic analyses. Our analysis is aimed at a large subset of the C programming language with the goal of scaling the analysis to real-world safety-critical C applications. The present paper is a step into this direction. We are also developing a machine-checked proof of correctness of the entire approach.
The two main contributions of this paper are thus the following:
• An extension of a previous hybrid information flow analysis for a subset of C that included pointers to scalars; our extension can deal with arrays and pointer arithmetic.
• The formalization of the underlying theory in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant, a full machinechecked proof of the correctness of our monitor semantics, and ongoing work on formalizing and proving correct our program transformation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model of information flow and non-interference. Section 3 describes our fully formalized semantics for information flow monitoring and its formal proof of soundness. Section 4 describes the program transformation implementing the flow monitor for C programs. Section 5 mentions some features of our concrete implementation, Section 6 surveys related work, and Section 7 concludes.
Information flow tracking by example
We illustrate the problems of information flow tracking with pointers and arrays in a series of examples. The goal of the information flow analysis is to ensure that all public outputs of the program are independent of all secret inputs. That is, running the program twice with the same public inputs but different secret inputs should give the same public outputs; this property is called non-interference. In our case, the analysis dynamically tracks the public/secret status of variables and treats every variable that is public at the end of the program as an output.
In general, there can be more security levels than just public and secret; in that case, they are required to form a finite lattice with the bottom element as the 'most public' security level. We assume an attacker who knows the program's source code and is able to make perfect deductions about secret inputs from observed public inputs and public outputs. We ignore timing, nontermination, and other side channels that may also leak secret information.
For this informal presentation, assume that the variable secret is of type int and tagged as 'secret'. All other variables are initially public (non-confidential) and of type int unless declared otherwise. The dynamic part of the analysis described in this paper works by instrumenting the code with additional monitoring code. Each variable x is associated with one or more additional label variables marked here by underlining the variable name and adding optional suffixes, e. g., x. Security levels are tracked as integer values 0 (public) and 1 (secret). Where levels from different sources must be taken into account, they are joined using the | (bitwise-or) operator, ensuring that the result is secret iff one of the inputs is secret. Most of the examples in this section follow Assaf's work [1] . Figure 1a exhibits explicit flows of secret information from secret to x and then further to z; the information flows explicitly via assignments. The analysis must recognize these two variables as secret; their values must not be output, otherwise some information about secret would leak. These flows can be monitored by instrumenting the code with the two assignments x = secret; and z = x | y; mirroring the original assignments.
Example 1. The code in

Example 2.
Conditional branches cause implicit flows from the condition to any assignment controlled by the branch. In Figure 1b , there is an implicit flow from secret to x and y: Inspecting their values may allow an inference whether secret is zero or nonzero. Implicit flows are tracked by the control context in a variable pc (program counter status), with a new variant pc ′ , pc ′′ , . . . for each branching statement. The initial value of the global pc is 0 (public), and every branching statement's own pc variable is computed as the combination of the directly enclosing pc variant and the branch condition's label. The current pc variable must be taken into account for any assignment.
Additionally, both branches must update the labels of any variables modified in the other branch to ensure that the flow is captured regardless of the actual path taken.
Note that constants are public and thus get the label 0. As this is the neutral element of the | operator, constants have no influence on the containing expression's status. Example 3. An assignment through a pointer introduces a flow from the pointer expression to every possible pointer target. In our monitor, these targets are identified by static points-to analysis and updated with the pointer's label. A label pointer tracks the exact target of the pointer at run time. This means that a pointer variable p gets two label variables, p for the label of the pointer itself and p_d1 (of type pointer to label) for the label of p's target. Whenever the program updates p to point to a target t, the monitor updates p_d1 to point to the label t of t.
The example in Figure 1c is monitored as follows:
The updates of x and y are needed to ensure a sound approximation of the respective labels because it is not known statically which of the two variables will actually be overwritten.
Example 4.
The main contributions of this paper concern the handling of arrays. Consider the problem of writing to an array at a secret index as in Figure 1d . The analysis must again treat x (and all of array) as a secret variable: Outputting x or any element of array at the end of the program would allow an attacker to infer whether the least significant bit of secret is 1. A single secret write to an array element thus taints the entire array. For efficient handling of flows through arrays, we introduce a summary label for the entire array which is updated monotonically on each write access to the array. The |= operator updates array by combining its old value with the right-hand-side value, i. e., it performs the equivalent of array = array | secret. Such updates are monotonic, so an array's summary label can never decrease. As we will see later, we often also need field-sensitive tracking of array fields in addition to the summary label.
Note that all examples except the first share a common property: A piece of code modifies some object, but it is not known statically which one of several objects (variables or array fields) is affected in a concrete execution. The dynamic part of the analysis, i. e., the instrumentation code, must be aware of all possible objects that may be affected and update their statuses to hold a safe over-approximation of the actual status. The set of possible target objects is computed by a standard points-to analysis, the static part of our analysis.
Monitor semantics
We can now formalize the intuitive explanations from the previous section as a system of information flow monitoring semantics of programs. The semantics compute a label memory Γ which tracks the labels of objects in memory. It is then possible to prove that this semantics satisfies the required noninterference property. The types, definitions, and proofs described in this section are fully formalized and checked in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [15] . Their presentation in the paper was generated automatically, directly from the Isabelle/HOL formalization. As the full development is 1900 lines long, we only show some key parts and omit auxiliary definitions, lemmas, and proofs. 1 
Expression semantics
We formalize a simple imperative language corresponding to a subset of C. Figure 2 shows the basics of the memory model. The types name and block are abstract; the type label is required to be some bounded lattice with a bottom element ⊥, a join operation ⊔, and a corresponding partial order ⊑.
A location loc is a pair of a block and an optional offset. A value val is either a number or a pointer to a loc. A block can hold a value block-val, which is either a scalar val or an array of unbounded size represented as a function from int to val. To simplify the first version of our theory, there are no multidimensional arrays: Array elements are scalars of type val. An environment E maps names to blocks, a memory M maps blocks to block values, and a label memory Γ maps blocks to their security labels. Figure 3 shows the abstract syntax of our expressions. The representation is designed to be as close as reasonably possible to the one used by Frama-C [12] , which in turn is based on CIL [14] . There is a distinction between lvalue expressions lval which evaluate to objects and rvalue expressions expr which evaluate to values. An lval may be based on a variable or a dereference expression. There is an auxiliary type offs for optional offsets into objects, i. e., array indexing. An expr may be a constant, the value of an lval (obtained using the Lval constructor), the address of an lval, or a binary operation on exprs. We have a generic arithmetic operator • that is intended to work on numbers and a pointer addition operator ⊕ for adding a pointer and an integer. For simplicity, there are no arithmetic comparisons or boolean operators. Figure 4 shows the inference rules capturing our definition of the semantics of expressions. The rules describe both the concrete semantics, i. e., the value computed by an expression, and our monitor semantics, i. e., the security label assigned to the expression. A judgement E, M, Γ ⊢ e → v, s means that in the context of an environment E, a memory M, and a label memory Γ, the expression e evaluates (as an rvalue) to the value v and the security label s. There are corresponding relations ← for the evaluation of lvalue expressions to locations and → o for offset expressions to optional integers. Offsets Some i, which arise from evaluating an Index offset expression, are used for array locations only. Scalar locations have offset None, which is the value corresponding to a NoOffset offset expression.
As an example, consider the C expression arr[idx] where arr and idx are variables. It is represented in the abstract syntax as Var arr (Index (Lval (Var idx NoOffset))). For evaluating it as an lvalue, the LVALVAR rule applies, and the memory block for arr is determined from the environment E. The index expression idx can be evaluated to an integer offset using the OFFSIDX rule and further recursive rule applications of LVALVAR and OFFSNONE.
Note that this presentation does not include static typing of expressions. Using scalar values with an index or array values without an index is a type error, as is interchanging Num and Ptr values. As usual, the semantics simply gets stuck in such cases. Note also that the generic binary operator • is interpreted by some unspecified eval-binop function whose details we do not care about.
Expressions' security labels are computed by the semantics by merging the labels of subexpressions using the label lattice's ⊔ operation. Constants and the locations of variables are considered public (⊥), while the labels of memory locations are read from the label memory Γ whenever the value of the memory location is read from the memory M in the RVALSCALARLVAL and RVALARRAYLVAL rules. Figure 5 shows the abstract syntax of statements of our target language. The Skip statement, program sequencing, If and While statements are standard. However, for technical reasons (to make proofs tractable), we currently use two different forms of the assignment statement: Plain Assign if a value is written to a scalar location and AssignArrayElem if a value is written to an array element. Figure 6 shows the semantics of statements, again describing both concrete semantics (effects of the program on the memory) and monitor semantics (effects on the security label memory). The judgements take the form E, S P , pc ⊢ program, M, Γ ⇒ M ′ , Γ ′ . This means that in the context E, S P , pc, the program program evaluated on a memory M and label memory Γ terminates with a new memory M ′ and new label memory Γ ′ . The meaning of the context element S P will be explained below. E is the environment, and pc is the program counter label.
Statement semantics
The concrete parts of the semantics, capturing the computation of the new memory M, are standard. The memory can only be modified by assignment. In the ASSIGNSCALAR rule, the assignment's lefthand side x is evaluated to a location consisting of a memory block b without an offset, i. e., a scalar location. The right-hand side e is evaluated to a value v. The new memory is obtained by updating the value stored at block b in the memory to be ScalarVal v. The ASSIGNARRAYELEM rule is similar but more involved. The assignment's left-hand side x evaluates to memory block b with an integer index i. The memory M must contain an array arr at block b. The new memory M ′ is obtained by updating arr at position i and storing this new array at block b.
The concrete semantics of If statements uses an unspecified function istrue of type val ⇒bool to select one of the branches to execute. The concrete semantics of While loops evaluates the body once if the condition is true, then re-applies a While inference rule in the new memory configuration. A loop Figure 6 : Semantics of statements in the example programming language. Both concrete effects on memory and effects on the security label memory are tracked.
fun collect-updates :: alias-function ⇒ instr ⇒ block set where
Figure 7: Definition of the update function used to track the effects of aliasing and unexecuted program paths on the label memory.
terminates iff the condition becomes false at some point, in which case the WHILEF rule applies and performs no further changes to the memory.
The monitor semantics deserves more detailed explanations. Consider first the expression Γ ′ = Γ(b := s) in the ASSIGNSCALAR rule. This updates the security label of the target block b to the new label s, which is computed from the label sl of the assignment's left-hand side's location, the label sv of the right-hand side value, and the current program counter label pc. This captures the direct information flow as shown in Example 1. After this, the label memory is updated again; the final monitor is Γ ′′ = update S P (x ::= e) s ′ Γ ′ . This captures pointer-induced flows as demonstrated in Example 3. If the lvalue x is a pointer expression and may refer to different memory locations at runtime, the labels of each corresponding memory block must be updated conservatively. This is done by the update function defined in Figure 7 . This function takes an alias analysis function S P , a program fragment, a label s and a label memory Γ. It applies the auxiliary function collect-updates to find all memory blocks that may be modified by the given program fragment, then produces a new label memory where the label of every block possibly modified by the program fragment is joined with the label s. In the particular case of the ASSIGNSCALAR rule, the program fragment passed to update is the assignment x ::= e itself, which means that the set of blocks to be updated evaluates to just S P x. Correctness of the update depends on a correctness criterion for the S P function itself. Our formalization uses a predicate admissible S P E M program (shown in Figure 8 ) to express that a static analysis S P computes a safe overapproximation of points-to sets with respect to the given program, environment, and starting memory. An alias function is admissible for a program in a certain configuration if it captures every assignment's target's correctly and is admissible for all possible configurations that arise in the evaluation of subprograms.
The ASSIGNARRAYELEM rule is similar to ASSIGNSCALAR in its handling of the label memory. The only difference is in the computation Γ ′ = Γ(b := s ⊔ l) where l is the memory block's old security label. This means that an array block's label can only ever increase monotonically, but never decrease. This behavior corresponds to the discussion of Example 4.
The inference rules involving control flow also use the update function to capture implicit flows as discussed in Example 2. After executing one of the branches of an If statement, update is used to adjust the security labels of all the memory blocks that may be modified in the other branch. Both the actual execution of one of the branches and the update of the other branch are performed using an updated program counter label pc ′ . Similarly, even if a While loop never iterates, the labels of all the objects that may be modified in its body are updated with pc ′ . All this ensures that implicit flows are correctly captured: The labels of objects that may be modified under the control of the branch condition are at least 
Figure 8: Definition of the admissible predicate on alias functions.
as high as the branch condition's label. If the branch condition is secret, these objects become secret as well, and no public information escapes that might allow attackers to infer anything about the condition.
Proof of monitor correctness
After describing the monitor semantics, we can now proceed to its proof of correctness. Recall that the goal is to prove non-interference: If a program is run twice on equivalent public inputs but possibly different secret inputs, all the public outputs must be the same on both runs. This ensures that the program's (public) output doesn't allow any inferences about the secret inputs. The equivalence of public inputs is formalized in the following definition of s-equivalence. Two memories M 1 and M 2 are equivalent up to a security label s if they have the same contents for every memory block whose label in a certain security memory Γ is below s:
(The mem-equal predicate captures equality of the values stored in block b in both memories. We omit its definition for brevity.) Somewhat similarly to s-equivalence on memories, we define a predicate imposing a partial ordering on label memories, saying that Γ 2 is less restrictive than Γ 1 up to s if it respects the ⊑ ordering on all blocks whose labels are below s:
With these definitions, we can state an important lemma saying that the evaluation of expressions in s-equivalent memories is deterministic in a certain sense:
lemma expr-evaluation-with-s-equivalence:
This lemma expresses that if expression evaluation yields a value with a label below s, then evaluating the same expression in an s-equivalent configuration will yield the same value and a smaller (or equal) label. The proof (omitted here) proceeds by mutual induction on the semantics of evaluation of the different kinds of expressions.
Our main result is the formal proof of the following soundness theorem:
theorem monitor-soundness: 
This theorem shows that running the same program twice in s-equivalent memories M 1 and M 2 (and corresponding side conditions on the program counter labels and security memories) preserves sequivalence. Inspection of memory blocks whose labels are below s in Γ ′ 1 does not yield any information to an attacker. The result only holds if the static analysis S P is admissible for the given program, i. e., it safely overapproximates all aliasing in the program when started from a given memory configuration.
Proof sketch. The proof of the soundness theorem proceeds by rule induction on the semantics. We will sketch the main idea of the soundness argument for assignments to scalars and for one branch of the evaluation of the If statement. In either case, the idea is to show preservation of s-equivalence and the 'less restrictive up to' relation by considering how the value and label of an arbitrary memory block b is modified by the program.
Rule ASSIGNSCALAR. We may assume that there exist derivations in the semantics showing both E, S P , pc 1 ⊢ x ::= e, M 1 ,
In these derivations, name the memory block referenced by x as b 1 and b 2 and the label of evaluating x as an lvalue as s 1 and s 2 , respectively. Assume also that there is some arbitrary memory block b where Γ ′ 1 (b) ⊑ s, i. e., after the assignment the label of b is below s. It suffices to show that
. Making a case distinction, assume first that b ∈ S P x. This means that b may be modified by this assignment according to the static analysis. It follows that s 1 ⊑ s since otherwise the update function would have changed b's label such that Γ ′ 1 (b) ⊑ s would not hold. Using s 1 ⊑ s we can apply the expression evaluation lemma from above to obtain b 1 = b 2 , i. e., the same block is assigned in both executions. Further, if b 1 = b, i. e., this is indeed the block that is modified by the assignment, another application of the lemma ensures that the same value is assigned (showing M ′ 1 (b) = M ′ 2 (b)) and that the expression's labels in the two derivation trees respect the ⊑ ordering, establishing
then the memory at b is not modified at all, and its label is updated safely using update, again establishing the intended results.
Finally, in the other case b / ∈ S P x. Because S P is an admissible analysis, it follows that b is not modified by this assignment. Hence the semantics rule modifies neither the memory nor the label memory, and the result follows directly from the assumptions.
Rule 
. The rules for the other branch of the If and for the While statement follow similar reasoning. Finally, the proof for evaluation of Skip is trivial, and the proof for program composition follows directly from the induction hypothesis for the subprograms.
The full, completely machine-checked Isabelle/HOL proof of this theorem is about 600 lines long, plus about 200 lines of proofs of key auxiliary lemmas. The structure of the proof itself follows the work of Assaf [1] , which gives a manually typeset paper proof of a little more than five pages (without handling arrays). We were able to reproduce the paper proof mostly faithfully, repairing some typographical errors and minor glitches along the way. The most important issue was that Assaf's proof of the assignment rule is too weak: His proof only shows Γ ′ 2 (b) ⊑ s (for a block b modified by the assignment) rather than the stronger result
However, it was easy to reuse the structure of the given proof and strengthen it to prove the necessary condition.
Program transformation
Given the abstract semantics from the previous section, we now turn to the question of how to implement the security monitor in practice. We want to insert monitoring code into a given program that tracks security labels. At the end of the execution of the program, the label variable x for each original program variable x should have the same value as Γ(E(x)) in the monitor semantics. The soundness proof of the monitor then carries over to the analysis code.
Information flow monitoring without pointers
Without pointers or arrays, inlining the dynamic analysis code is simple: Whenever a variable x is read or written, we insert appropriate reads or writes of the corresponding label variable x. Additionally, for every statement affecting control flow, a new program counter status variable is created and updated as in the monitor semantics in Figure 6 . Additional assignments are inserted to model the effects of the control flow branch not taken, as with the update function in the monitor semantics.
The difficulties arise when pointers are used: What is the label variable corresponding to a pointer dereference expression *p? In the abstract theory, such expressions evaluate to memory blocks b which are used to access both the memory M and the label memory Γ. However, these memory blocks are not available as first-class objects in C, so we need a different way of finding the correct label variable to access.
Information flow monitoring with pointers to scalars
The solution for tracking pointers developed by Assaf [1] , which we follow, is to mirror all pointer structures in the original program in the information flow monitor. For this purpose, each pointer p of type T * (n) (i. e., that may be dereferenced n times) is associated with n label pointers p_d1, . . . , p_dn. The intention is to ensure that at any point in the program, the expression * (i) p_di for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n evaluates to the label of * (n) p.
For example, if pointer p is made to point to variable x by an assignment p = &x in the original program, a corresponding label pointer variable p_d1 is made to point to the label variable x by the inserted assignment p_d1 = &x. Reads and writes through *p can then be mirrored in the analysis as reads and writes through *p_d1. Assaf gives a formal definition of this transformation and proves that it preserves the invariant that for all pointers in the program, a pointer p points to a target x iff the corresponding label pointer points to the target's label. This allows a proof of the correctness of the transformation, i. e., it establishes that the instrumented program computes the same security labels as the label memory Γ in the underlying semantics.
Information flow monitoring with arrays
We extended the approach described above to handle arrays. Note that the monitor semantics in Figures 4  and 6 assume that the memory block storing an array has a single security label, not individual labels for individual array elements. The reason for this was touched on in Example 4: If an array element is written at a secret index, reading another array element and finding it has a non-secret label would leak information about the value of the index.
For this reason, we associate each array a with a single label variable a called the summary label. As in the ASSIGNARRAYELEM inference rule in the semantics, every write to an array element triggers a weak update of this label: The summary label l is not overwritten by the new label s (which incorporates the labels of the index and the value to be written) but with the joined value s ⊔ l. As security labels form a lattice, we have s ⊑ s ⊔ l and l ⊑ s ⊔ l. This means that over a sequence of assignments to elements of the array with labels s 1 , . . . , s n , the values of the summary label l 1 , . . . , l n always form an ascending chain with respect to ⊑. Furthermore, at any point, the current l i is a safe overapproximation of all s 1 , . . . , s i−1 written so far. Our analysis ensures that the label of any read from array a incorporates its summary label a. This means that, if at any point in the program a secret value or secret index is used in an assignment to an element of a, all future reads will be treated as secret. This property ensures the equivalence of a to the label Γ(E(a)) and hence the soundness of our information flow analysis in this aspect.
The summary field also plays an important role in handling pointers to array elements as well as pointer arithmetic. Consider the following program fragment:
This code assigns the address of array element a[i] to pointer p, increments p to point to the next array element, then writes to memory through p. This final write affects an element of the array a, so we must ensure that our analysis updates the summary label a correctly.
To this end we must ensure that a label pointer associated with p always points to the target's summary label and is not moved by pointer arithmetic. In the example above, a summary pointer p_summary must be generated by the analysis and pointed to the address of a. This pointer is not affected by indexing or pointer arithmetic, i. e., it always points to a regardless of the value of the index expression i and regardless of the pointer increment using ++. The assignment through *p can then be mirrored in the analysis by a weak update through *p_summary, which results in a weak update of a as required.
In the presence of arrays of pointers, a summary label is not enough, however: We must additionally track pointer relationships in an array-field-sensitive way. Consider a slightly modified version of the example above, where a is now an array of pointers rather than an array of numbers as before, and p is therefore a pointer to a pointer: p = &a[i]; p++; a[i+1] = &x; **p = y; Here the final assignment through **p is an assignment to the variable x, and the dynamic information flow analysis must therefore be able to execute an appropriate update of its label x. Thus there must be an appropriate label pointer p_d2 where **p_d2 is the object x.
We achieve this by associating a second label with each array of pointers a[n]: Besides the scalar summary label a, we also use an array of label pointers a_d1 [n] . The intention is to ensure that if a[i] points to x, then a_d1[i] points to x. In the example above, we can let **p_d2 point to a_d1 [i] initially and then mirror the pointer arithmetic p++. We arrive at the following fragment of monitoring code (ignoring summary labels for simplicity):
The generated code ensures that at the last assignment, p_d2 points to a_d1[i+1], which in turn points to x. The last assignment thus updates x as required.
We can thus summarize the requirements for our analysis: Every array a needs a summary label a and an array of exact labels a_d0. Every pointer p needs a label p for the pointer itself as well as a summary label pointer p_d1_summary to point to p's target's summary label and a label pointer p_d1 to point to p's exact target's label. These rules must be applied recursively for types of nested pointers or arrays, adjusting the number of possible dereferences (d). Figure 9 shows how we compute the list of types and dereferencing levels using the function labels. The recursive computation is captured in the function labels-aux. The most subtle issue is that labels must add an outermost summary label for array types.
For a C type declaration int *b [10] , encoded as TArray (TPtr TInt) 10, this system computes the following label types, which our program transformation turns into the appropriate type declarations:
[Label Summary 0 TInt, int b_status; Label Exact 0 (TArray TInt 10), int b_status_d0 [10] ; Label Summary 1 (TArray (TPtr TInt) 10), int *b_status_d1_summary [10] ; Label Exact 1 (TArray (TPtr TInt) 10)] int *b_status_d1 [10] ; The types on the left-hand side were computed by the Isabelle/HOL function labels in Figure 9 , the C type declarations on the right by the equivalent code in our Frama-C plugin implementing the program transformation for C programs.
Putting everything together, Figure 10 shows another variant of the examples above and the complete dynamic information flow monitoring code generated by our system. In the statement performing pointer arithmetic, we use a variable secret to make the flow more visible: When the pointer p has been offset by secret, its label is joined with secret's label. At the subsequent assignment to *p, this label is propagated to the target's label. Observe also how pointer expressions for summary labels perform weak updates (using the |= operator), but the corresponding exact labels receive strong updates.
The remaining challenge is to complete the formalization of this program transformation in Isabelle/HOL. The key is a precise statement of the invariant that whenever a pointer expression p points to a variable x, the corresponding label pointer expression p points to x. We will then show that the assignments inserted by the program transformation preserve this invariant, which will allow us to establish a complete soundness proof.
Implementation notes
We have implemented the program transformation sketched above as a plugin in the modular C analysis and transformation framework Frama-C [12] . The current prototype handles programs with arbitrary data structures composed of arrays, pointers, and struct types. For the alias analysis S P needed by the transformation, we rely on Frama-C's built-in Value analysis, which computes both aliases for pointers and value approximations for numeric variables using intervals and other domains. The transformation is implemented as a transformation of the Frama-C AST, which can then be output as C code. At the time of writing, some details of real-world C programs are not yet handled by the analysis, which precludes us from giving a detailed experimental evaluation of our approach. The main missing feature is the treatment of goto statements. These are inserted by Frama-C's AST normalization for early return statements inside conditionals and for continue statements in for loops. We are currently working on finalizing the handling of the information flows due to this kind of non-compositional control flow.
Using Frama-C's support for code annotations, we allow security levels of variables to be specified as /*@ public */ or /*@ private */ at the point of declaration. The corresponding label variables are then initialized accordingly. Labels are tracked as integer values of 0 (public) and 1 (private) and are efficiently combined using the bitwise-or operator |. We do not currently support more general lattices; however, extending the current implementation to lattices that can be represented as bitvectors (up to 64 bits) is straightforward.
Users may also insert annotations like // @ assert security_status(x) == public; in their programs. Such annotations may also occur as function preconditions using Frama-C's annotation language ACSL; for example, any output function could require its arguments to be public. This allows users full freedom to specify their application-specific information flow policies. For example, functions that may cause information to be written to network sockets (such as the common send(1) system call) may have contracts requiring their inputs to be public. As another example, cryptographic code may be annotated to ensure that branch conditions are always independent of the cryptographic keys; otherwise, key-dependent control flow may cause differences in timing or other side-channels observable by attackers [3, 6] . Without such annotations, our analysis never reports a policy violation, i. e., without a user-defined policy everything is permitted. As such policies are inherently application-specific, we want to keep our analysis as general as possible and do not specialize it for particular flow policies.
Transformed, annotated programs often contain enough information for the Value analysis to be able to prove such assertions without having to execute the instrumented program at all. Thus our hybrid analysis combined with the powerful components of the Frama-C framework can often be used as a powerful static analysis as well.
Related work
As mentioned several times throughout the paper, our work is heavily based on the formulation of information flow monitoring by Assaf et al. [2, 1] . This work only handles pointers to scalars; we have formalized this theory in Isabelle/HOL, extended it to handle arrays, and are working on extending it further. Our concrete implementation of the analysis in Frama-C is also based on the prototype developed by Assaf.
Besides this prototype, we are aware of two implementations of dynamic information flow analysis that aspire to handle real-world programs. Both of these are designed for JavaScript and intended for settings with dynamic code loading. In contrast, our approach assumes a complete program in a C-like language on which a static points-to analysis can be run. The approach by Kerschbaumer et al. [11] handles arrays, but the details are not described; the authors only mention that an array may 'consist[. . . ] of heterogeneously labeled fields'. This heterogeneous labeling is something our approach consciously avoids for soundness reasons, to avoid information leaks through array indices. In our approach, reading an array element always involves reading the array's summary label (see Example 4) . The authors do not describe any formal or informal proof of non-interference for their analysis.
The other well-developed analysis for JavaScript is JSFlow [9] with its extended hybrid version [8] . Both track the labels of array elements precisely, but a different notion of non-interference from ours is used: In this variant, it is not allowed to assign secret values to locations that previously held public values (the converse, overwriting a secret value by a public value, is allowed). The monitor aborts the program if a violation of this policy is detected. In our approach, this would correspond to adding an assertion to every assignment statement. In contrast, our approach is more permissive and only uses such constraints at user-defined program points; as discussed above, our analysis is completely independent of any specific flow policy. The authors prove non-interference of both versions of JSFlow.
In the literature, there are various static information flow analyses, often formulated as flow-sensitive type systems [17, 10] , as well as further hybrid static/dynamic analyses that are somewhat comparable to ours [13, 16] . Arrays are occasionally mentioned in connection with type systems [17] but, to our knowledge, never for the systems involving some dynamic monitoring. As our work shows, arrays raise subtle soundness issues, in particular when combined with pointers and pointer arithmetic; to our knowledge, we are the first ones to handle these issues in detail for a C-like language.
The terminology of weak and strong updates is borrowed from pointer analysis [4] .
Conclusions and future work
We presented a hybrid information flow analysis for the C programming language with pointers, arrays, and pointer arithmetic. Our analysis is implemented by instrumentation code that tracks information flows by managing security labels associated with each object in the program. As in previous work, pointers to labels mirror pointers to data in the original program. We extend this to arrays, tracking flows both in a field-sensitive way and as a safe overapproximation in a separate summary field for each array. Our analysis is implemented using the Frama-C program analysis and transformation framework. A machine-checked proof of the correctness of the monitor semantics was formalized using Isabelle/HOL. We will also formalize the program transformation and prove its correctness; adding the required static typing support to our dynamically typed semantics is ongoing work.
We will further extend this work to handle structures in a field-sensitive way. We also intend to use pointer analysis information to allow us to handle type casts between pointer types.
